Dealing with transboundary crises in the European Union: options for enhancing effective and legitimate transboundary crisis management capacities by Cabane, Lydie & Lodge, Martin
  
Lydie Cabane and Martin Lodge 
Dealing with transboundary crises in the 
European Union: options for enhancing 
effective and legitimate transboundary 
crisis management capacities 
 
Discussion paper [or working paper, etc.] 
 
 
Original citation: 
Cabane, Lydie and Lodge, Martin (2018) Dealing with transboundary crises in the European 
Union: options for enhancing effective and legitimate transboundary crisis management 
capacities. TransCrisis, London, UK. 
 
Originally available from London School of Economics 
 
The Transcrisis project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme under grant agreement No 649484. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91587 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2019 
 
© 2019 TransCrisis Ltd 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
  
 
 
Dealing with Transboundary Crises in 
the European Union: 
Options for enhancing effective and 
legitimate transboundary crisis 
management capacities 
 
TransCrisis White Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
The TransCrisis consortium involves the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (LSE), Crisisplan, 
University of Utrecht, Central European University, Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), 
University of Catania, University of Stockholm and ThinkTank Europa. 
 
The lead authors of this document are Lydie Cabane and Martin Lodge (LSE) based on collaboration and 
contributions from all project partners. 
 
The Transcrisis project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme under grant agreement No 649484.  
 
 
 
  
 3 
 
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
1. Introduction: Transboundary crises as a key challenge for Europe ............................................ 6 
2. Background: Transboundary crises and the ‘new normal’ ........................................................... 8 
3. Challenges to EU transboundary crisis management ................................................................. 10 
4. Variety in transboundary crises in the EU multi-level governance system ............................. 14 
5. Debating the future of transboundary crisis management in the EU ....................................... 16 
6. Diagnosed deficits in transboundary crisis management in the EU ......................................... 19 
7. Approaches to enhance effective and legitimate crisis management in the EU ...................... 24 
8. Recommendations ............................................................................................................................ 30 
Appendix 1: Strategies to enhance transboundary crisis management in selected cases .................. 33 
Appendix 2: List of relevant EU provisions and texts ............................................................................. 37 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: TransCrisis research project ........................................................................................................... 7 
Table 2: Banking crisis management in the EU ........................................................................................ 16 
Table 3: The Youth Guarantee .................................................................................................................... 17 
Table 4: The seven tasks of crisis management ........................................................................................ 18 
Table 5: Dealing with invasive alien species in the EU ........................................................................... 19 
Table 6: Electricity transmission networks crisis management system ................................................ 21 
Table 7: Strategies for enhancing EU transboundary crisis management ............................................ 25 
Table 8: Enhancing transboundary terrorism crisis management ......................................................... 34 
Table 9: Enhancing transboundary electricity crisis management ........................................................ 35 
Table 10: Enhancing backsliding crisis management .............................................................................. 36 
 
  
 4 
Executive Summary  
The European Union has experienced a series of transboundary crises that have tested its capacity and 
legitimacy. The financial and refugee crises have highlighted the political and administrative limits to 
existing EU crisis management arrangements. In particular, they have strained understandings of 
member state solidarity, and they have given rise to conflicts over the direction of future EU 
transboundary crisis management capacities within and across policy domains. 
 
To develop enhanced transboundary crisis management capacity and legitimacy, it is essential to 
understand the different types of crises that have affected the European Union - ranging from 
‘traditional’ emergencies, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, to the consequences of enhanced 
market liberalisation and integration, such as the banking crisis or the dramatic levels of youth 
unemployment, and the explicit rejection by member states of key liberal democratic constitutional 
commitments, namely ‘backsliding’. In addition, the context of the new normal of re-nationalised 
electoral politics, the challenge of coordinating highly dispersed systems of multi-level governance, and 
the tension of dealing with (often incompatible) short- and long-term objectives also shape EU 
transboundary crisis management. 
 
This White Paper identifies four deficits in contemporary transboundary crisis management: deficits 
in central authority, in prescriptiveness, in subsidiarity, and in flexibility. These deficits point to the 
contested nature of debates over future transboundary crisis management in the EU and its member 
states.  
 
This White Paper identifies four different approaches towards enhancing capacity and legitimacy: i) a 
reliance on ‘ad hoc’ responses, ii) a strengthening of EU-level capacity; iii) a strengthening of multi-
level governance; and iv) a strengthening of consistency of member state policies. Each of these 
approaches is associated with distinct advantages and pathologies.  
 
Capable and legitimate leadership is required to acknowledge and realise the different approaches 
towards transboundary crisis management. Leadership is required to develop understanding and 
discussion about the consequences of different approaches and to thereby also shape the capacities to 
respond effectively to actual transboundary crisis management. In doing so, legitimacy will also be 
enhanced; after all, this is a time when the ‘value added’ of the EU has to be reconsidered and 
addressing transboundary crises is a fundamental part of such a conversation.  
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In order to enhance capacity and contribute to legitimate transboundary crisis management, this White 
Paper calls in particular for: 
· clarification of who takes leadership, at which level of government, and how, regarding key tasks 
associated with transboundary crisis management; 
· acknowledgment of the administrative capacity prerequisites in a multi-level governance system 
associated with different transboundary crisis management approaches; 
· recognition of the inherent trade-offs involved in different approaches towards transboundary 
crisis management; 
· development of a distinct transboundary crisis management capacity that considers cross-
domain implications in addition to cross-jurisdictional concerns; 
· creation of a challenge function at the EU level to assess member state capacity to prevent and 
manage transboundary crises. 
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1. Introduction: Transboundary 
crises as a key challenge for 
Europe 
Addressing transboundary crises represents 
one of the key societal challenges facing 
Europe. The European Union (EU) and its 
member states have been affected by a range of 
transboundary crises whose cumulative effects 
amount to a polycrisis. The financial and the 
refugee crises continue to leave a strong 
imprint on the European Union and its member 
states. Disasters, emergencies as well as 
terrorism have triggered demands for stronger 
transboundary co-operation. Concerns about 
cyber-security and climate change-related 
disasters have further underlined this call for 
stronger co-operation. 
 
Transboundary crises have revealed the 
interdependence across European societies and 
economies, as well as across political and 
administrative systems. Such crises have given 
rise to increased coordination and calls for 
solidarity among member states. However, it is 
the same integration and interdependence 
that are seen as a source of transboundary 
crisis. These transboundary crises have created 
considerable tensions among member states, 
have led to debates about the appropriate role 
of the EU in managing transboundary crises, 
and they have had considerable political and 
economic impact on member states.   
 
The very idea that the EU is the solution to 
transboundary crisis challenges is more 
contested than ever. Since the turn of the 
millennium both the question of where (at what 
level) and how (new rules vs. more temporary 
ad hoc measures) crises ought to be dealt with 
have become more and more debated as 
integration and interdependence have 
increased. The combination of these factors 
suggest that it is a time of crisis in the EU’s 
transboundary crisis management, even if the 
heights of the financial and refugee crises might 
be said to lie in the past (at least temporarily).  
 
This White Paper represents a call for action 
and reflection to enhance the capacity to 
address transboundary crises in areas that are 
critical for citizens’ economic and social well-
being. Proactive consideration and 
development of transboundary crisis 
management capacities will also reduce the 
likelihood of future crises from overwhelming 
decision-makers. In other words, good 
transboundary crisis management is as much 
about establishing governance arrangements 
that prevent crises from occurring as it is about 
managing actual crises. 
 
Enhancing legitimate transboundary crisis 
management capacity is therefore central to 
any debate regarding the future governance of 
the EU. The current time presents a pertinent 
moment to consider and develop options for 
the future of transboundary crisis management 
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in the European Union.  Not only does the EU 
face an accumulation of transboundary crises 
(section 2), as well as a set of governance 
challenges that hamper the EU’s ability to deal 
with crises (section 3). This White Paper 
describes the various types of crises in the EU 
multi-level governance system (section 4), and 
the various mechanisms to deal with 
transboundary crises in the EU (section 5). It 
diagnoses specific deficits in transboundary 
crisis management systems across EU 
institutions and governing mechanisms (section 
6).  It identifies approaches to enhance effective 
and legitimate transboundary crisis 
management (section 7) and then offers a set of 
specific recommendations (section 8).  
 
This White Paper acknowledges the various 
institutional and legal contexts in which crises 
take place and argues that no single recipe for 
developing legitimate transboundary crisis 
management capacity exists. Rather, what the 
EU requires is to consider different strategies 
of enhancing transboundary management 
capacity and their distinct trade-offs. What is 
therefore needed is capacity-building in 
transboundary crisis management instead of 
continuing a pattern in which decision-makers 
knee-jerk from one crisis to another or trialing 
the traditional, but potentially outdated recipes 
for tackling transboundary crises. Finally, this 
White Paper calls for a much needed reflection 
on the capacity and legitimacy of 
transboundary crisis management in the EU 
which at present is not just in a state of crisis, 
but also presents a source of crisis for the EU 
itself.
   
Table 1: TransCrisis research project 
The research project ‘Enhancing the EU’s Transboundary Crisis Management Capacities’ 
(TransCrisis) has focused on: 
· The financial crisis and the ways in which political leaders sought to define the financial crisis 
vis-à-vis their citizens; 
· The growth of institutional capacities of European Commission DGs in exercising key tasks for 
transboundary crisis management, including the growth of detection and  ‘sense-making’ 
activities; 
· The role of EU-level agencies in transboundary crisis management, such as within the EU (in the 
case of food scandals) and outside the EU (Ebola); 
· The multi-level transboundary crisis management arrangements in various sectors, ranging from 
the refugee crisis, to banking crisis management, electricity transmission networks, invasive 
alien species and youth unemployment; 
· The transboundary crisis resulting from member state ‘backsliding’ on liberal-democratic 
constitutional commitments.  
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2. Background: Transboundary 
crises and the ‘new normal’ 
Transboundary crises are at the heart of the 
‘new normal’ confronting the European Union. 
The past few years have highlighted the 
changing nature of crises. Transboundary crisis 
management involving the EU and its member 
states is not only about dealing with distinct 
emergencies and disasters such as volcanic ash 
clouds or migration-related humanitarian 
crises. It is also about addressing the economic, 
environmental and social consequences of 
market integration, and protecting the 
normative foundations of the EU as guarantor 
to peace, prosperity and liberal democratic 
stability. The growing sense of vulnerability to 
shocks represents one part of the ‘new normal’ 
that has fundamentally affected the ways in 
which EU citizens and member state 
governments see the European Union.  
 
This growing sense of vulnerability to shocks is 
accompanied by a heightened concern about 
the EU’s capacities to address transboundary 
crises. The problems of handling 
transboundary crises became apparent during 
the financial and refugee crises, constitutional 
crises in a number of member states over 
questions of territory and constitutional rights, 
Brexit, terrorism, or shifting geopolitical 
attitudes towards multi-lateral institutions, to 
the on-going implications of the sovereign debt 
crisis. The financial crisis has also affected the 
resources of member states to respond to 
subsequent crises. Most importantly, it risks 
further undermining the legitimacy of the 
European Union in the eyes of its citizens. 
Indeed, the very way that the EU and its 
member states handle transboundary crises has 
increasingly become contested, both in terms of 
the legitimacy of the EU system and in terms of 
its rules and performance in any given case. 
 
The traditional view of European Union 
integration views crisis as an opportunity to 
enhance coordination among member states or 
to shift policy-making competence to the EU 
level. This view requires reconsideration. What 
qualifies as a crisis deserving an EU-level 
response is increasingly contested, especially 
when it comes to matters of high national 
political sensitivity and when policy choices 
involve redistributive decisions across member 
states. Some policy sectors are characterised by 
a shared understanding of what constitutes a 
‘crisis’ (especially those areas where shared 
professional norms exist); in other domains, 
however, there are different, if not competing 
understandings of what constitutes a 
transboundary crisis, leading to disagreements 
as to whether a response at the EU-level is 
appropriate (such as in youth unemployment). 
In other policy domains, transboundary crises 
might be affected by a genuine lack of political 
consensus over means and ends.  
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What makes transboundary crises a particular 
challenge for the European Union?  The 
standard definition of crisis involves the 
perception of threat to core values or essential 
systems, urgency and ambiguity or uncertainty. 
Crises can therefore be acute – involving, for 
example, the need to maintain the liquidity of 
banks, addressing the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, infrastructure failings, or terrorist 
attacks – or they might be of the ‘creeping’ kind 
– involving, for example, the incrementally 
advancing vulnerability of national social 
security and pension systems. A focus on 
transboundary crises highlights the 
importance of different boundaries that affect 
effective and legitimate crisis management. 
Boundaries are not just about national and sub-
national jurisdictions; they also relate to the 
dispersed nature of administration across 
member states (organisational boundaries). 
Policy domains are characterised by 
considerable differences in terms of perceptions 
of policy problems and solutions among policy 
communities (professional boundaries). The 
presence of boundaries, therefore, gives rise to 
questions of organisational over- and underlap. 
It highlights challenges arising from cascading 
effects when boundaries are unable to insulate 
systems against crisis, and when there are 
failures in information exchange across 
organisational boundaries. 
 
 
The distinct nature of transboundary crises 
within the context of the ‘new normal’ requires 
urgent attention by the European Union and its 
member states. There is little to suggest that 
transboundary crises will become less relevant 
to the EU and its member states in the future. 
Future crises will test transboundary crisis 
management arrangements. In the context of 
the EU, transboundary crises strain 
understandings of member state solidarity, 
they raise questions about the appropriate 
ways of governing these transboundary crises: 
The (non-) effective management of one crisis 
has immediate effects on the legitimacy of the 
European Union and member state 
governments. 
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3. Challenges to EU 
transboundary crisis 
management 
This ‘new normal’ does not just refer to the 
types of crises that the European Union is likely 
to face over the coming years, but it also refers 
to the changing context of governing in an age 
of electoral volatility, re-nationalising politics 
and resource-depleted public administration at 
the level of most member states. Any attempt to 
develop more effective and legitimate capacity 
to deal with transboundary crises needs to 
recognise the significance of three broad trends 
that have contributed significantly to the 
perception of crisis in EU transboundary crisis 
management, namely: 
 
· The growing re-nationalisation of 
politics. 
Transboundary crisis management is inherently 
about the acknowledgement of 
interdependence and the recognition that many 
contemporary crises are not confined to 
national boundaries and that national 
administrative capacities are insufficient to deal 
with the consequences of these crises. Member 
states have lost boundary control over crisis 
management, as was made evident during the 
financial and refugee crises. At the same time, 
the aftermath of these crises has further 
encouraged a re-nationalisation of electoral 
politics. The highly visible dependency on 
decision-making at the transnational level, 
often associated with unpopular decisions and 
perceptions of gridlock, has encouraged some 
political parties to campaign on platforms that 
are overtly hostile to EU integration and 
dispute the legitimacy of supranational policy-
making. Such demands put pressure on ‘pro’-
EU parties and EU leadership to prove their 
efficiency and legitimacy. In some cases, this 
campaigning takes the form of demanding a 
different type of European Union. In other 
cases, this campaigning takes the form of an 
explicit rejection of the EU.  
 
This tension between the need to address 
transboundary crises and the rising re-
nationalisation of electoral politics raises 
questions regarding the appropriate level of 
decision-making and competence to act. The 
cross-party elite consensus that has long been 
the cornerstone of EU integration – whether in 
supranational or intergovernmental form – is 
increasingly challenged by Eurosceptic and 
populist parties that call for a re-nationalisation 
of public policies across Europe. More 
generally, the changing electoral context means 
that the traditional ways of justifying support 
for EU-level solutions are increasingly met with 
scepticism, if not outright rejection. The ‘secret’ 
of EU integration (technocratic and mostly 
consensual decision-making at EU level) is 
facing increasing hostility because of the 
politicisation of EU decision-making (in terms 
of increased salience, opinion polarisation and 
audience expansion) and because of the 
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changing nature of national electoral contests.1 
One particular example is Brexit, another the 
on-going conflict over political dynamics in 
Hungary and Poland. Even though some 
election results since 2017 might offer counter-
examples, such as in France and the 
Netherlands, and opinion polls suggest that the 
European Union has re-gained legitimacy 
across member state populations, the call for 
new initiatives to sustain the European Union 
cannot deny these changes in national electoral 
politics, including party system diversification. 
Calling for transboundary crisis management 
does not appear to be a particularly widespread 
electoral asset.  Yet, to ensure the continued 
legitimacy of the EU, it has to provide efficient 
and legitimate transboundary crisis 
management. 
 
· The challenge of coordinating highly 
dispersed systems of governing. 
The past three decades have brought about 
considerable power dispersion across systems 
of government, because of the multi-level 
governance of the European Union, or of 
administrative systems reforms promoting 
agencification and privatisation. These 
transformations have increased the challenges 
for collaboration and coordination at the 
national and EU level. An emphasis on self-
                                                 
1 See P. de Wilde, A. Leupold and H. Schmietke 
(2016) ‘Introduction: the differentiated 
politicisation of European governance’, West 
European Politics, 39(1): 3-22. 
governance has become increasingly 
problematic: in an age where transboundary 
crises call for cooperative and redistributive 
responses within and across member states, 
these are exactly the kind of issues in which co-
operation among member states is least likely 
to flourish. Recent transboundary crises (e.g., 
terrorist incidents) have highlighted the 
problems in information exchange between 
different national authorities (within and across 
member states). Dispersion-related problems 
raise questions about the appropriate ways of 
improving coordination. One such way is to 
consider the level of prescriptiveness that is 
supposed to establish the ways of joint-
working, information exchange and allocation 
of competence to act. A key question in terms 
of crisis management (independent of the 
question of whether it is best addressed at the 
EU or the member state level) is whether it 
warrants more elaborate rules and procedures, 
or whether a less prescriptive, flexible approach 
to crisis management is to be preferred. 
 
· The tension between short- and long-
term objectives.  
Decision-making during crisis (in the EU and 
elsewhere) is usually characterised by late night 
summits, fire-fighting and short-term concerns, 
whether these are about preventing immediate 
negative consequences of a crisis (such as the 
collapse of a banking sector), tomorrow’s media 
headlines or electoral fortunes. More generally, 
the logic of integrating markets through 
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supranational regulation has come increasingly 
into conflict with the logic of member state 
authority to decide on certain issues, such as 
questions of security of supply or fiscal 
redistribution in the case of single banking 
resolution. In an age where the EU and its 
member states intend to signal their legitimacy 
by dealing with economic hardship and 
business survival, questions of longer-term 
sustainability are at risk of being discounted, 
most of all in the face of pressure from well-
resourced interests.  
 
Critical examples are debates over approaches 
towards energy security or climate change. In 
these areas, objectives emphasising subsidiarity 
and security of supply might clash with the 
logic of transnational market liberalisation. An 
on-going fudging of conflicts might be a 
convenient political strategy, but leads to an 
inevitable degrading of capacities over time. 
Such constellations also question the ability of 
the EU to tackle long-term challenges beyond 
market liberalisation.  
 
This example illustrates three further 
challenges for the enlarged EU. First, how to 
make long-term decisions when a number of 
member state governments are engaged in 
national electioneering: in a (at present) 28-
member EU a national election takes place on a 
near bi-monthly basis, allowing for plenty of 
scope for contesting transboundary crisis 
management in the name of electoral 
campaigning.  
 
Second, there is a tension between long-term 
consistency that favours integration of 
liberalised markets and short-term needs for 
flexibility. The logic of market integration calls 
for rule-based consistency that is outside of the 
scope of national politics. Such a 
‘depoliticisation’ dynamic conflicts with calls 
for immediate responses to security and 
welfare-related crises. The very nature of a 
crisis means that some political authority is 
called on to step in and manage or mitigate an 
urgent threat – the very opposite of 
depoliticised decision-making. 
 
Third, and more generally, there are questions 
about what kinds of transboundary crisis 
arrangements are legitimate in the eyes of the 
European citizen. Transboundary crisis 
management involves redistributive 
consequences with clear winners and losers.  
 
Such questions touch on issues associated with 
core state powers, such as security of supply. 
Given the intricate linkage between crisis 
management and welfare state functions, 
member states are also ambivalent about losing 
political and administrative boundary-control 
over critical questions with welfare 
implications for their citizens. Indeed, 
questions of legitimacy link to the limited, if not 
absent, visibility of EU transboundary crisis 
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management systems. This lack of visibility 
aggravates the risk of EU transboundary crisis 
management becoming a useful blame 
magnet for national political interests.  
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4. Variety in transboundary crises 
in the EU multi-level 
governance system 
Adopting effective and legitimate approaches 
towards crisis management requires an 
understanding of the variety of EU multi-level 
governance arrangements that are available. 
Four types of transboundary crisis 
management systems can be distinguished by 
considering the degree of EU authority and the 
‘site’ of the crises: 
 
· Crises – in areas of EU competence 
affecting EU member states.  In these cases, 
crises can be processed within the context of 
the existing resources of the EU institutions, 
whether it is the presence of special units 
inside DGs, the existence of joint 
frameworks for decision-making, or the 
existence of networks created through the 
presence of EU agencies.  These areas relate 
directly to actions that might be triggered by 
the Solidarity Clause (Art. 222) and  involve 
the support of national administrations or 
EU agencies, such as Frontex; or some 
aspects of the regulatory arrangements in 
banking resolution mechanisms. 
 
· Crises – in areas of shared EU competence 
with member states. In these cases, 
problems in dealing with crisis emerge from 
the action (or non-action) of member state 
administrations in view of more or less 
formalised requirements as part of EU 
policy frameworks. Inconsistent or lack of 
member state action might be due to a lack 
of resources and capacities – for example, in 
being able to detect and report on potential 
problems in electricity transmission 
networks, report on food safety-related 
illnesses, or engage in agreed actions to 
eradicate or manage species identified as 
invasive and alien. In less formalised 
settings where member states have legal 
competence (‘subsidiarity’), the lack of 
capacities to inform and change domestic (or 
local) policies in view of broader 
transboundary objectives is similarly 
problematic, but faces further problems in 
that no EU-level enforcement mechanisms 
exist beyond ‘naming and shaming’.   
 
· Crises – in areas of limited EU competence. 
These kinds of crises are those involving, for 
example, ‘backsliding’ by member states on 
normative commitments as part of EU 
membership. Backsliding affects the 
normative core of what it is to be an EU 
member state. Examples of ‘backsliding’ are 
meddling with the judiciary and the 
depletion of ethics watchdogs, sleaze busters 
and other bodies that are supposed to 
protect civil liberties. Backsliding is difficult 
to address within EU arrangements beyond 
the suspension of funding or the ‘nuclear’ 
option of suspending voting rights.  
 
Similarly, territorial conflict within member 
states might be regarded as a transboundary 
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crisis according to this type: despite the 
long-standing convention that domestic 
territorial politics are a matter for national 
governments, the implications of on-going 
conflict are likely to have repercussions on 
the EU more generally, as illustrated in the 
context of the conflict over the status of 
Catalonia within Spain. The crisis for the 
European Union is that it has become a 
central object in domestic territorial conflicts 
and in member state backsliding, without 
having the motivation or capacity to address 
these challenges to its normative core. 
Indeed, attempts at doing so make the EU 
an interested party within a specific conflict 
rather than a potential neutral arbiter.   
· Crises within the competencies of the EU 
but affecting transboundary crises outside 
of the member states. These kinds of crises 
relate to public health or natural disaster 
emergencies in third countries, or the calls to 
engage in geopolitical and commercial 
relationships affecting third countries.  This 
White Paper focuses on crises internal to the 
EU, but in many ways, the external relations 
of the EU reflect similar patterns as the three 
other types of crises (i.e., extensive, mixed 
and limited) and it also involves overlap 
with other international organisations, such 
as NATO. 
 
  
 16 
5. Debating the future of 
transboundary crisis 
management in the EU 
Contributions to current debates about the 
future of the European Union offer visions of 
‘more Europe’ according to more supranational 
or more intergovernmental flavours. Equally, 
debates about the desirability of ‘variable 
geometry’ and differentiated integration have 
some currency in the area of transboundary 
crisis management. However, given the 
uncertainty over the contours of transboundary 
crises and their cascading character, any form of 
differential governance arrangement across 
member states is likely to generate even more 
complexity by adding organisational and 
jurisdictional boundaries. The mechanisms 
created after the financial crisis to deal with 
banking crises are a good example of such 
complexification in multi-level governance. 
 
Similarly, the case for a re-nationalisation of 
public policies and markets is put forward by 
those who regard the EU as merely interested in 
centralised harmonisation without meaningful 
citizen participation. However, such views 
ignore the presence of crises with transboundary 
characteristics (for example, when the causes of a 
crisis lie outside the boundaries of a member 
state).  
 
 Hence, this White Paper calls to move beyond 
these broad debates and consider actual 
implementation which, in turn, relates to 
questions of capacity and legitimacy.  Over the 
past two decades, a number of initiatives have 
aimed at improving transboundary coordination 
during times of crisis across a broad range of 
sectors, which are discussed in the rest of the 
White Paper. These initiatives address 
traditional security concerns, such as in the area 
of civil protection, as well as crises attributed to 
negative consequences of market integration 
(banking crisis, youth unemployment).   
 
At present, the European Union has a range of 
transboundary crisis mechanisms and 
capacities. These include Treaty provisions (the 
‘Solidarity’ and ‘mutual assistance’ clauses (art 
222 and Art 42(7) respectively). In addition, the 
EU has itself become a ‘crisis manager’ with 
Table 2: Banking crisis management in the EU  
The financial crisis highlighted the problems 
associated with a lack of co-ordination in 
banking supervision in a single financial market. 
The creation of a European Banking Authority in 
2011 to set crisis management standards 
constituted a first response. In response to the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and large bail-
outs, a Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive was 
adopted in 2014 to harmonise banking 
resolution in the EU and adopt a common ‘bail-
in’ model. In the Eurozone, a banking union 
transferred resolution and supervision powers 
at the EU level to the ‘Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’ (attached to the ECB) and the ‘Single 
Resolution Mechanism’ (attached to both the 
Commission and an intergovernmental treaty).   
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crisis rooms and frameworks having become a 
regular feature across DGs and EU agencies.2  
 
Transboundary crisis management involves 
traditional domains associated with crisis, 
namely civil protection (with the Council 
‘Integrated Political Crisis Response’, the 
ARGUS alert system or the European Civil 
Protection Mechanism including an Emergency 
Response Coordination Centre within the 
Commission) and other emergency related 
responses located across EU agencies (as within 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control) and the Commission (such as the EEAS 
for external crises). These are important 
mechanisms, but their growth raises questions 
about how these mechanisms operate in practice 
and how they interact with each other, and with 
those mechanisms that have also emerged at the 
member state level.  
 
In addition, EU transboundary crisis 
management also consists of frameworks to 
support the stability of systems during times of 
crisis within the context of the Single Market 
(such as in finance, energy or other 
infrastructures), and broader policy dynamics, 
such as climate or demographic change. These 
domains are characterised by the transboundary 
effects of market liberalisation and cross-border 
economic activity that come into conflict with 
                                                 
2 Boin, A., Ekengren M., and Rhinard M. 2013. The 
European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and 
Prospects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
national political preferences and competencies, 
as well as constitutional dynamics within 
member states – as in the case of youth 
unemployment. In such cases, EU transboundary 
crisis management may take the form of 
regulations, directives, or recommendations that 
intend to address transboundary effects across 
levels of governance.  
 
Nevertheless, these existing frameworks have 
been widely found to be insufficient. A more 
extensive debate about the transboundary crisis 
management capacity of the European Union is 
needed to deal with the diverse crises affecting 
its citizens. Indeed, developing effective 
capacities that address crises experienced by EU 
citizens is one essential way of enhancing the 
legitimacy of the EU. 
 
To approach the question how to organise 
transboundary crisis management, it is essential 
to consider what core tasks or functions need to 
be fulfilled. Table 4 illustrates seven tasks that 
are essential for crisis management. Evaluations 
Table 3: The Youth Guarantee 
High rates of youth unemployment (peaking at 
above 50 per cent) in (some) EU member states 
led to the adoption in 2013 of a Council 
Recommendation that created a ‘Youth 
Guarantee’. This first European social ‘right’ 
aimed at fostering access to the labour market 
and training, and added financial support to 
particularly affected member states to support 
national measures for the training and skilling of 
unemployed under the age of 25. 
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and exercises based on these seven tasks have 
been utilised by national and European crisis 
managers in order to prepare for and manage 
crisis. Any debates should therefore focus on 
questioning who should execute these functions 
and how.
   
Table 4: The seven tasks of crisis management 
Seven tasks or functions are central to effective and legitimate crisis management capacity. These tasks 
can be distributed across EU, national and sub-national, as well as non-state institutions. Whatever their 
locations, they all contribute to effective and legitimate crisis management. These seven tasks include: 
- Detection: the timely recognition of an emerging threat 
- Sense-making: the collecting, analysing and sharing of information to develop a shared picture 
of a situation 
- Decision-making: the choice and implementation of strategic decisions that relate to the 
immediate crisis response and its aftermath 
- Coordination: the identification of key actors and the facilitation of collaboration 
- Meaning-making: the formulation of a key message that provides advice to citizens and 
suggests that the situation is under control 
- Communication: delivery of a central messages to select audiences 
- Accountability: the account-giving to different public fora in order to explain conduct during 
and following immediate crisis. 
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6. Diagnosed deficits in 
transboundary crisis 
management in the EU 
The past decade has also highlighted the 
challenges for crisis management in fields of 
EU competence. Criticism has focused on 
limited analysis, quality of decision-making 
and lack of enforcement activity, as well as on 
the rigid nature of EU-level rules. For example, 
criticisms of the EU during the financial and 
refugee crises centred on its rigid frameworks 
on the one hand and on its limited effect on the 
other. In many cases, these polar opposite 
criticisms were made at the same time, by the 
same actors. 
Responses to the various transboundary crises 
over the past decade have proved challenging 
for EU transboundary crisis management. On 
the one hand, there have been moves to re-
introduce boundaries (even if on a temporary 
basis, such as the case with Schengen). On the 
other hand, there has been considerable 
strengthening of executive-based EU-level crisis 
management regimes, such as the creation of a 
banking union that provides common banking 
crisis management within the Eurozone. This 
complexification represents a further source of 
tension that impedes effective and legitimate 
transboundary crisis management. 
 
Underpinning all debates about developing 
transboundary crisis management capacity in 
the EU are two fundamental questions, namely 
those relating to resources and legitimacy. 
 
Effective transboundary crisis management 
requires resources, whether these are of an 
organisational, legal, informational or financial 
nature. For example, one of the key problems in 
EU transboundary crisis management relates to 
the presence of extensive EU-level provisions 
that lack the underlying member state 
administrative capacity to perform the required 
functions, for example in the case of the regime 
applying to invasive alien species.  
 
 Table 5: Dealing with invasive alien species in 
the EU 
The Single Market has increased the risks from 
the transfer of species (animals and plants) into 
new ecological contexts, leading in some cases 
to extensive economic and social costs. A 
Regulation was adopted in 2014 to list a set of 
species of common interest across member 
states, requiring them to take action to reduce 
the risk of invasions. 
 
Similarly, as pointed out by the European 
Court of Auditors (2017), the ambition of a 
European Youth Guarantee fell short when it 
came to implementation because of the 
considerable variety in the ways in which 
administrations, especially in the member 
states most affected by the economic crisis 
(Spain, Italy, Greece), could actually process 
this policy in view of their own limited 
resources. Questions of administrative capacity 
therefore need to consider the pre-requisites for 
different crisis management strategies, whether 
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these are demands on analytical, delivery, 
oversight or coordination capacity.  
 
Effective transboundary crisis management 
also requires legitimacy. Solving 
transboundary crises require a legitimate 
political authority to make decisions that are 
likely to affect citizens and governing 
arrangements. Yet, whatever the type of EU 
transboundary crisis management mechanisms 
(Commission resources, regulations relying on 
member states, private mechanism such as 
CORESO in the area of electricity transmission 
system operators3), they often lack a clear 
political authority as member states and EU 
institutions have been reluctant to acknowledge 
the need and existence of such common 
mechanisms in light of the various challenges 
described above. In other words, 
transboundary crisis management needs to 
address the legitimacy question as to whether 
European citizens are willing to incur losses 
imposed by supra-national authorities, or 
whether they rather prefer arrangements that 
rely on national authorities, but that arguably 
increase the likelihood of a crisis (and therefore 
its costs). 
 
At the governance level, the EU’s 
transboundary crisis management has revealed 
four central deficits that fundamentally affect 
                                                 
3 CORESO is a Brussels based regional security 
coordinator of Central Western European 
transmission system operators. 
the capacity in which transboundary crisis 
management in the European Union can be 
exercised. These deficits point to fundamental 
design tensions that affect all transboundary 
crisis management and that need to be 
addressed before assessing the administrative 
capacity prerequisites. Addressing the tensions 
that emerge from these deficits should 
therefore be at the heart of any discussion as to 
how to enhance transboundary crisis 
management capacities.  
 
· A central authority deficit.  
There is a diagnosed lack of oversight and 
leadership across different domains that have 
experienced transboundary crises over the past 
decade. Central authority refers here both to a 
lack of overall leadership and a lack of 
administrative capacity at the EU-level. The 
financial crisis highlighted the need for a 
harmonised, if not common, banking 
regulatory and crisis management framework. 
A lack of central authority was evident in EU 
decision-making characterised by deep 
cleavages across different member states and 
regions of the EU (a similar lack of consensus 
on problem-definition and potential solutions 
was also evident in the development of 
approaches dealing with youth 
unemployment). Similarly, concerns about the 
stability of electricity supplies have led to 
repeated calls for the adoption of more 
centralised risk and crisis preparedness 
measures to reduce regional differences and 
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enhance cooperation. In addition, concerns 
exist about the quality of implementation in 
different member states given a lack of quality 
information. Lack of administrative capacity at 
member state level represents a potential 
further contributing factor in aggravating 
transboundary crises (as in the case of youth 
unemployment).  
 
· A prescriptiveness deficit.  
There is a diagnosed lack of consistency in the 
administrative context of transboundary crisis 
management, especially in terms of reporting 
and compliance requirements placed on 
member states. Transboundary crises over the 
past few years have given rise to complaints 
about the discretionary ways in which member 
states have responded to crises and also the 
lack of detailed guidance that would enable 
information exchange and other forms of 
coordination. One example here is the 
uncoordinated nature of policy responses 
across member states during the financial crisis. 
Concerns about a lack of coordinated responses 
also emerged in electricity grid management 
during the 2017 cold spell when some regions 
of the EU were experiencing expected and 
unexpected shortfalls in electricity generation.4  
 
 
                                                 
4 ENTSOE, 2017, Managing critical grid situations, 
https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/News/170530_
Managing_Critical_Grid_Situations-
Success_and_Challenges.pdf  
 
· A flexibility deficit.  
 EU transboundary crisis management regimes 
are also said to lack flexibility. The 
centralisation of authority and one-size-fits-all 
frameworks fit uneasily with crises that are 
unevenly felt across member states (or where 
different regions are vulnerable in different 
ways), and where there are differences in 
administrative capacities to deal with 
transboundary crises. In some cases, this may 
involve less prescriptiveness: more 
discretionary approaches may be more 
supportive of effective transboundary crisis 
management than demands for strict uniform 
rule adherence. One example here might be the 
invasive alien species domain, where some 
criticism has been directed at the way in which 
a common EU list has been developed despite 
Table 6: Electricity transmission networks crisis 
management system 
The goal of an integrated European electricity 
market places considerable emphasis on network 
interconnection. At the time of writing, crisis 
management remained primarily a national 
competence; however several mechanisms had 
been created to provide coordinated responses to 
national and regional disruptions. Operational 
responsibilities rested with transmission network 
operates that defined ‘network codes’ (e.g., on 
‘Emergency and Restoration’) and Regional 
Security Coordinators. Cooperation among 
member states was governed by a Directive (from 
2005) and a Regulation (from 2009). Both of these 
provisions were criticised as being insufficient. At 
the time of writing, a Regulation dealing with risk 
preparedness was under discussion that included, 
for example, the creation of Regional Operational 
Centres to enforce coordination. 
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the highly diverse ecologies existing across the 
European Union.  
 
· A subsidiarity deficit.  
EU transboundary crisis management is also 
said to lack appreciation of capacities outside of 
the framework of the European Union. One of 
the central debates across EU governance is the 
appropriate level of competence. On the one 
hand, demands for more EU capacity have 
traditionally focused on questions as to the 
supranational or intergovernmental character 
of particular arrangements. On the other hand, 
the criticism has been made that the EU lacks 
an effective appreciation of the capacity of 
arrangements that sit outside the EU, such as 
the Pentalateral Energy Forum in Western 
Europe.5 In other words, the EU needs to 
acknowledge the existence of European-level 
capacities that exist as part of bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral agreements that are however not 
governed by EU provisions.  
 
It is not feasible to address all four deficits at 
the same time. For one, the diagnosis of a 
particular deficit is linked to existing 
perceptions as to the appropriate way in which 
the EU should be governed, and also how 
particular crises should be interpreted. 
 
                                                 
5 The Pentalateral Forum is an intergovernmental 
initiative, involving an autonomous secretariat, 
established to support cross-border exchange of 
electricity and market integration. 
Apart from highlighting the likely existence of 
competing understandings as to what 
constitutes effective and legitimate 
transboundary crisis management, they point 
to fundamental tensions between criticisms of 
‘too much EU leadership’ and those that 
complain about ‘too much gridlock’ in decision-
making, as well as tensions between those that 
criticise a lack of consistency and those 
criticising too much flexibility. Questions as to 
how much flexibility should be granted to 
member states are likely to be highly contested, 
especially in areas where member states are in 
explicit opposition to other member states and 
EU institutions. 
 
These diagnosed deficits therefore go beyond 
criticisms of the presence of particular 
resources and capacities at one particular level 
of government rather than another. In fact, it is 
not just that capacity-related criticisms vary 
across different crises, but they also differ 
during the same crisis. For some member states 
and EU institutions particular developments 
merit the involvement of the European 
Commission as central authority, while other 
member states deny the appropriateness of that 
response. 
 
In view of these diagnosed deficits and 
tensions, any discussion about appropriate 
transboundary crisis management needs to 
move to questions of the where and how, in 
terms of appropriate level of organisation, and 
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the appropriate extent of prescriptiveness. The 
‘where’ question invites answers in terms of 
increasing the robustness of crisis management 
capacity at the EU-level (whether that be 
through supranational or intergovernmental 
institutions or instruments) or at the national 
level. The ‘how’ question requires answers as to 
whether crises merit new rules and procedures 
with a high level of prescriptiveness, or 
whether particular types of crises are better 
managed though more flexible, ad hoc, 
temporary policy tools. Answering such 
questions is unlikely to be straightforward as it 
involves high political sensitivity, debates 
between competing programmatic views 
regarding the European Union and particular 
policy problems, and the need to acknowledge 
diverse administrative arrangements and 
capacities at member state level. 
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7. Approaches to enhance 
effective and legitimate crisis 
management in the EU 
In light of the diversity of crises and 
institutional arrangements at the EU level, it is 
important to consider different trajectories in 
which institutional arrangements can be 
developed further so as to address the capacity 
deficits identified in the previous section. What 
matters, therefore, is not that all these tasks (see 
Table 4) are performed within one organisation, 
but that capacity to perform these tasks exists 
within and across levels of governance and 
organisations, and that there is knowledge 
and coordination of these capacities. Indeed, it 
is likely that effective and legitimate execution 
of the seven tasks of transboundary crisis 
management involves different levels of 
governance. 
 
Four approaches or strategies for enhancing 
crisis management capacity can be 
distinguished (see Table 7). Two dimensions 
are at the heart of the debates about the EU’s 
capacity to deal with transboundary crisis 
management. One is the level of competence, 
namely with the extent to which the EU should 
be centrally involved in addressing 
transboundary crises, or whether that 
responsibility should lie with ad-hoc 
arrangements and the member states. The 
second dimension deals with questions of 
dispersion or fragmentation; it addresses the 
question of the degree of prescriptiveness of 
rules guiding responses to crisis across levels 
and sites of governance.  
 
These four approaches are not intended to be 
mutually exclusive or fully exhaustive. Instead, 
the purpose is to accentuate differences and 
highlight the options available. In view of the 
diagnosed capacity deficits and the need for 
crisis leadership across these tasks for effective 
and legitimate transboundary crisis 
management, each one of these strategies has 
distinct implications in terms of the allocation 
of legal authority, and organisational (staffing), 
and financial resources. These different 
scenarios also have distinct implications for 
leadership in transboundary crisis management 
in the EU. Leadership, whether in 
organisational and individual terms on the one 
hand, or political and administrative on the 
other, is required to develop the kind of 
capacities to mitigate future transboundary 
crises, but as the discussion below highlights, 
leadership requirements exist across levels of 
government, and vary according to task and 
type of crisis. The Appendix offers further 
elaboration of these strategies on specific cases 
(terrorism, electricity, backsliding). 
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 (1) Rely on ad hoc responses.  
This option relies on ad hoc responses to 
particular crisis incidents. Such an approach 
promises ‘tailor-made’ responses to particular 
crises. In doing so, a reliance on ad hoc 
responses reduces the costs of developing crisis 
management regimes that lack popular support 
and involve tricky redistributive conflicts 
across member states, and that may not be 
suited for future crises in the first place. It 
would involve a reliance on summits to address 
particular crises. Relying on such crisis 
management responses implies that future 
crises are not of such a fundamental nature that 
they are an immediate threat to social and 
economic life across member states and 
therefore also a threat to the European Union.  
 
In view of the underlying dynamics and types 
of transboundary crises observed over the past  
 
years, it is likely that such a reliance on ad 
hocery is more costly in the long-term than 
adopting more anticipatory approaches. For 
one, such an approach is not targeted at 
preventing particular risks (and does not seek 
to mitigate its effects). The absence of 
framework means that there is a lack of 
expectations as to levels of appropriate 
responses to crises and regarding decision-rules 
which will detrimentally effect the execution of 
the critical crisis management tasks outlined 
earlier. Adding inconsistent transboundary 
crisis management arrangements across sectors 
will create further scope for ambiguity at times 
of actual crisis and therefore is likely to become 
a source of crisis itself. A reliance on a series of 
‘summit of all summits’ to address one 
particular crisis or another might make for 
good headlines; however, it fuels the sense of a 
wider crisis of crisis management in the 
Table 7: Strategies for enhancing EU transboundary crisis management 
Strengthen consistency among member states 
Advantages: Adjusts to diversity across member 
states and encourages consistency in goals, but 
not necessarily means 
Pathologies: Limited interest among member 
states to report and mitigate according to set 
benchmarks and guidance, given also member 
state diversity.  
Strengthen EU level capacities 
Advantages: Establishes leadership responsibilities 
through formal authority 
Pathologies: Information asymmetry, problems in 
dealing with diversity and potential lack of 
implementation at the national/sub-national 
level; legitimacy concerns 
Rely on ad hoc responses  
Advantages: Limited requirements for building 
crisis management capacity outside times of crisis 
Pathologies: Problems with co-ordination and 
development of timely responses; likely source of 
further ambiguity and conflict during times of 
crisis 
Strengthen EU-national multi-level governance 
Advantages: Joint working among EU-level and 
national administrative actors allows for 
adjustment according to diverse circumstances 
Pathologies: Lack of oversight and co-ordination 
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European Union, therefore reducing the 
legitimacy of the EU as a whole in general, and 
of European transboundary crisis management 
capacities in particular. A reliance on summitry 
might also come undone as summits become 
sites for political grandstanding in view of 
national electorates. 
 
(2) Strengthen EU level capacities  
According to this option, the key to improved 
transboundary crisis management lies in 
strengthening the EU institutions and crisis 
management regimes. This would require re-
enforcing or establishing formal legal authority 
to act by EU institutions, backed by sanctions. 
Adopting this option would require the 
resourcing of the distinct crisis management 
infrastructures that have already emerged 
across EU institutions and a fuller reflection on 
what resources are necessary for effective 
engagement with crises that affect some or all 
member states. Furthermore, strengthened 
capacities would also be essential to ensure 
better information from across all of the 
European Union member states and tools to 
support efforts to address emerging and actual 
crises. It is for this reason that the European 
Commission has recently advocated the 
creation of a dedicated capacity for civil 
protection activities in the case of natural 
disasters (rescEU). 6 A further example is the 
proposal to strengthen the status of ENISA (the 
                                                 
6 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/resceu_en 
EU’s cybersecurity agency) to support crisis 
management in cybersecurity across the EU.7  
 
This option allocates clear leadership roles in 
any particular domain. It works primarily for 
the kind of crises that affect the whole of the 
EU. It relies on consistent member state 
responses, backed by a supposedly neutral 
arbiter to assess member state performance, as 
in the case of banking supervision and 
resolution. It might also be an advantageous 
strategy to deal with acute crises that do not 
necessarily involve redistributive conflicts 
among member states, but where additional 
support can be directly targeted into specific 
areas. However, such a central level capacity 
can be organised in different ways – such as the 
creation of particular capacities within DGs, the 
creation of agencies or expanding the remit of 
particular agencies, or creating more 
intergovernmental arrangements.  
 
There are certain disadvantages with this 
option. First, it is not at all obvious that all 
transboundary crises are best addressed 
through a consistent and centralised EU-wide 
framework, especially as regional variety in 
performance might be considerable. In 
addition, there is also the question as to the 
                                                 
7 Commission Recommendation on coordinated 
response to large scale cybersecurity incidents 
and crises, 13 September 2017 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/201
7/EN/C-2017-6100-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
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political feasibility of centralising authority and 
capacity at the EU level, given potential 
political sensitivities at the member state level 
on the one hand, and national and sub-national 
administrative diversity on the other. It is, for 
example, questionable whether the reliance on 
the legal force of a Regulation (instead of a 
Directive) that interacts with a variety of 
national regimes will necessarily enhance 
compliance despite its legal force. Instead, such 
a strategy is more likely to dilute the normative 
authority of a Regulation in general.  
 
(3) Strengthen EU-national multi-level 
governance  
This approach to enhanced transboundary 
crisis management encourages the further 
development of networks of national and EU-
level institutions, some of which also rely on 
sectoral governance. A range of similar multi-
level governance systems exist, ranging from 
the discretion of transposing EU Directives, 
looser forms of cooperation, such as national 
responses to recommendations (as in the case of 
youth unemployment), to the existence of 
sectoral and agency networks with governance 
responsibilities, e.g., ENTSO-E (for systems 
operators) and ACER (for regulators) in 
electricity. 
 
Strengthening multi-level governance 
arrangements involves the specification of legal 
authority across different institutions so as to 
address coordination problems due to actor 
fragmentation. The emphasis on developing 
transboundary crisis management capacities in 
this way would rely on enhancing the 
information provision across member states 
and the actual implementation of decisions 
taken at the transnational level (beyond formal 
transposition). It also necessitates central 
oversight, in particular from the European 
Commission. Since the reliance on member 
states to develop appropriate crisis 
management capacities in view of EU-level 
obligations requires not just a willingness and 
capacity to do so (politically and 
administratively), this option would require 
mechanisms to address differential crisis 
responses, with some ‘reserve’ oversight 
powers to compensate for potential failings at 
the member state level.  
 
Such a network approach is frequently 
employed across sectors in the European Union 
and it is best placed to deal with transboundary 
crises that affect all member states but in 
differential ways (in terms of timing or 
intensity), whether it is because of exposure, 
constitutional reasons or because of different 
types of vulnerabilities. One might argue that 
such an approach enhances legitimacy in that it 
relies on member state institutions, but it might 
be said to lack effectiveness if member states 
lack the resources to engage with processes. 
 
The disadvantages of this approach are the 
reliance on the resources of national 
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administrative bodies in informing 
transnational processes. It is for this reason that 
some critics dismiss this kind of approach as it 
poses too high demands on the various actors 
at a time of crisis. Another related issue is the 
differentiated resources between member states 
and how these have been affected by the 
financial and economic crisis. This can lead to 
imbalances in that decisions are largely 
informed by and reflective of the interests of 
those member states with the capacity and 
motivation to engage in these processes. It also 
might suffer from a lack of hierarchy in that 
member states authorities’ decision-making, 
even in the context of leadership by the 
Commission, might become gridlocked. This 
concern with developing co-ordinated 
responses requires arrangements in which 
central authority can ‘overrule’ national 
responses, especially in cases where non-
compliance risks aggravating the 
transboundary nature of a particular crisis.  
 
(4) Strengthen coordination within and among 
member states  
This strategy to enhance crisis management 
capacities emphasises the centrality of member 
states in effectively and legitimately addressing 
crises, even those of a transboundary nature. 
The emphasis is on developing the capacities 
and the procedures informing member state 
crisis responses so as to allow for timely and 
consistent behaviours. The primary emphasis 
here would rely on EU-level benchmarking 
(such as the European Semester), the presence 
of multi-lateral agreements among member 
states outside the EU framework to the 
development of guidelines for national 
administrations (as those developed by the 
OECD for emergency risk governance) and the 
targeted support for national and sub-national 
administrations in developing resources. 
 
The emphasis on member state coordination 
can take a range of forms. One is to adopt 
shared standards or benchmarks in order to 
define what a crisis is and when and how a 
member state should respond. Member states 
would be required develop shared benchmarks, 
report on their own performance and readiness 
and learn about ‘smart practices’ in comparison 
from their own experiences, as in the case of the 
European Semester. A looser framework would 
be to rely on multi-lateral agreements outside 
the framework of the EU. Examples of such 
frameworks exist in the form of the Pentalateral 
Forum dealing with the development of 
electricity crisis management standards among 
its member states. Such intergovernmental 
arrangements might lack the legal standing of 
EU instruments, but might be seen as 
alternative European ‘solutions’ to sensitive 
transboundary crisis management issues. 
 
The advantage of this approach is that it 
establishes a common framework in areas 
where arguably there is little scope for the 
agreement on a strategy to enhance crisis 
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management capacities and where member 
states might be reluctant to engage in any 
transfer of authority in the first place. It might 
also be the most suitable strategy for those 
crises that occur across member states but 
where the impact is largely localised.  
 
Such an approach has the disadvantage to 
introduce further diversity into EU multi-level 
governance. It lacks oversight and is prone to 
member state gaming and cheating. Some 
extent of mutual reporting might take place, 
but it usually is taking place in a ‘low political 
attention’ level in that reporting reflects 
information that is already collected at the 
national level and reflects positively on existing 
member state policies. In addition, despite 
some evidence of ‘learning’, whether these 
instruments actually encourage member states 
to enhance their transboundary crisis 
management capacities is also questionable, 
especially in contexts where the ‘cost’ of 
mitigation is high and the benefits of these 
measures are largely occurring among other 
member states. It might even be argued that 
such an approach simply reinforces existing 
national administrative structures and therefore 
risks that attention to transboundary crises will 
be subsumed and subordinated by domestic 
agendas. 
 
 
 
None of these four approaches therefore offer 
clear-cut advantages over the other approaches. 
Considering these approaches carefully 
nevertheless offers one way to consider in a 
more reflective way how and where capacities 
for transboundary crisis management in 
particular policy domains and across domains 
should be developed so as to enhance 
effective and legitimate transboundary crisis 
management in the European Union. 
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8. Recommendations 
Simple and elegant solutions are simply not 
available. It is neither feasible nor sufficient to 
simply call for a ‘more Europe’ of strengthened 
and centralised EU capacities in view of the 
highly diverse administrative infrastructures 
across member states and the separate electoral 
logics that shape national policy choices and 
that come into conflict with broader aims of the 
EU, such as market integration. Similarly, 
intergovernmental arrangements are 
insufficient: the critical aspects of crisis 
management involve the ‘trivial’ day-to-day 
administrative working. Likewise, a ‘return to 
the member state’ is hardly a universal option 
for transboundary crisis management. Such an 
option would enable member states to further 
undermine the normative core of the EU (in the 
case of backsliding by member states, for 
example), and it would also trigger 
considerable coordination problems in case of 
future transboundary crises, as debates 
surrounding the future relationship between 
the EU and Brexit-UK illustrate. 
 
Appropriate leadership in transboundary crisis 
management does not involve a universal call 
for ‘more EU governance’. The time for such 
Pavlovian responses to transboundary crises is 
clearly over. Instead, leadership for enhanced 
capacity and legitimacy requires an 
acknowledgement of the various ways in which 
transboundary crisis management can be 
conceived and, more importantly, that each 
strategy involves its own pathologies. For 
example, a highly prescriptive EU-level 
approach will always incur criticism for its 
rigidity, lack of flexibility and lack of 
democratic credentials. Credible crisis 
leadership needs to anticipate these criticisms 
and engage in dealing with the resultant trade-
offs.  
 
This White Paper therefore advocates a mixed 
approach towards transboundary crisis 
management in the EU. A mixed approach is 
not an admission of intellectual defeat or 
analytical confusion, but can be based on clear 
principles. These principles involve the 
acknowledgement of the need to consider the 
tasks of effective and legitimate transboundary 
crisis management in view of the different 
approaches. This means, first of all, that not all 
transboundary crises require similar 
governance arrangements. Instead, what is 
required is an understanding of where and how 
particular tasks are supposed to be executed. It 
also requires an understanding of how to 
address particular resource constraints that 
might impede the execution of these particular 
tasks. In particular, this White Paper calls for: 
 
· A clear understanding as to the ‘who’ takes 
leadership and ‘how’ across the different 
tasks identified for capable and legitimate 
transboundary crisis management. Episodes 
of transboundary crisis have highlighted the 
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need to establish shared understanding of 
legitimate leadership, and these 
understandings need not involve central 
EU-level authority alone, but an 
appreciation of the various governance 
capacities that exist across levels of 
government (and outside of government). 
 
· The acknowledgement of administrative 
capacity prerequisites. Any attempt at 
transboundary crisis management needs 
instruments to identify threats and mitigate 
them. Such arrangements cannot be 
prescribed through formal rules, but require 
consideration of the type of organisational, 
financial, legal and information resources 
required. Such resource requirements do not 
merely relate to the capacities relevant for 
the execution of particular tasks, but also to 
the need to co-ordinate, whether it is in 
terms of joint-working or in terms of 
information exchange. Assessing capacity 
with the ‘transboundary crisis management 
capital’ survey instrument offers one way of 
developing a better understanding of 
existing capacities across the key tasks of 
transboundary crisis management.8 
 
                                                 
8 See TransCrisis (2018) Crisis management capital 
development: a survey tool, 
https://www.transcrisis.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/D7.1-Crisis-capital-
management-development.pdf 
· The recognition of the inherent trade-offs 
involved in governing transboundary crises 
as each strategy encompasses its specific 
advantages and pathologies. Such 
recognition should also be central to debates 
about the future of EU transboundary crisis 
management across different policy 
domains in order to encourage awareness 
and debate, as well as enhance legitimacy. 
 
· More concretely, the development of a truly 
transboundary crisis management capacity. 
Existing transboundary crisis management 
capacities are largely organised on a purely 
sectoral level. What is missing is a 
transboundary capacity to move beyond 
sectoral boundaries in order to develop an 
appreciation of potential vulnerabilities ex 
ante and address cascading effects across 
sectoral boundaries during times of crisis 
(e.g. unemployment in case of a financial 
crisis).   
 
· The creation of an ex ante challenge 
function at the European level is required 
to assess the capacity of member states to 
gather and report information, to generate 
sufficient legal, organisational, financial and 
information resources to process demands of 
transboundary crisis management, and to be 
able to take appropriate action during times 
of crisis. Such an ex ante challenge function 
could take the role of a peer-review process, 
as practiced by the OECD. Such exercises are 
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far from problematic as they raise concerns 
about how to handle evident non-
compliance. Difficult decisions have to be 
made as to when to support capacity 
building at member state level and when to 
apply informal and formal sanctions. 
Without a clear appreciation of the need to 
urgently consider the crisis of 
transboundary crisis management in the 
European Union, any future transboundary 
crisis risks returning the European Union to 
the days of wider existential crisis.  
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Appendix 1: Strategies to enhance 
transboundary crisis management 
in selected cases 
The four strategies or approaches of addressing 
transboundary crises are explored in more 
detail by focusing on different transboundary 
crisis dynamics and existing variety in EU 
competencies. In the following, we discuss 
types of crises associated with civil protection 
and security (terrorist attack), with large 
infrastructures (electricity transmission 
networks) and with the tendency of member 
state governments to turn back on earlier 
constitutional commitments (backsliding). 
Tables 4-6 illustrate the advantages and 
pathologies of the four strategies to enhance 
transboundary crisis management across the 
three types of crisis and what kind of broad 
demands they would place on the key tasks for 
effective and legitimate transboundary crisis 
management. Only by openly considering, 
debating and weighting these advantages and 
pathologies, feasible and legitimate 
transboundary crisis management 
arrangements can be established. 
 
(1) Enhancing terrorist attack crisis 
management 
The example of a terrorist attack illustrates that 
while a move towards a central authority at the 
EU level would provide for increased resources 
as well as more visible leadership, it raises 
questions as to the appropriate resources and 
degree of ‘reach’ into member state 
competencies, especially in areas of domestic 
security. Looser arrangements, such as a 
reliance on ad hoc cooperation, would, in 
contrast, reduce the preventive capacity of 
transboundary cooperation, especially in terms 
of formalised information exchange. 
 
Even a reliance on standardised procedures is 
faced with questions as to how powerful such 
frameworks can be in the face of organisational 
and jurisdictional boundary questions. Finally, 
measures of enhanced cooperation (such as a 
reliance on Schengen) offer the prospect of 
multi-level governance in terms of limited 
centralised authority and reliance on member 
state administration. However, as the refugee 
crisis and the French response to terrorist 
attacks (when it invoked the mutual assistance 
rather than the Solidarity clause), highlighted 
such looser arrangements are vulnerable to 
member state decision-making that undermine 
transboundary joint-working.  
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(2) Enhancing electricity crisis management   
Transboundary crises relating to questions of 
critical infrastructures, such as potential  
blackouts caused by electricity transmission 
network disruption, point to different 
governance dynamics for effective 
transboundary crisis management. A reliance 
on central authority might offer the prospect of 
requiring comparable information 
requirements and ways of ensuring consistent 
patterns of compliance. However, a reliance on 
such a central authority faces the information 
asymmetry problems inherent in such complex 
vertical relationships. It is questionable whether 
a central authority would easily receive timely 
information and be able to respond without 
engaging in considerable redistributive 
conflicts (as to who would be protected and 
who would not). This case raises the interesting 
question as to what is more legitimate in the 
eyes of the European citizen: an EU level 
regime that enhances information exchange but 
takes decisions as to who will bear losses and 
who does not, or a national (or sub-national) 
level regime that distributes losses within its 
territory, but in doing so reduces information 
exchange across boundaries, potentially leading 
to considerable losses elsewhere.  
 
A reliance on enhanced multi-level governance 
would primarily rely on regulated self-
regulation by industry (such as ENTSO-E, the 
European Network of Transmission System 
Operators - Electricity). However, such 
arrangements raise questions as to the 
oversight over these providers and how 
Table 8: Enhancing transboundary terrorism crisis management 
Europeanised member states: strengthen 
consistency among member states 
(limited) Schengen - information sharing system, 
enhanced system compatibilities 
 
+ enhances national capacities and cross-national 
cooperation 
-  national organisation boundaries, turf and trust 
Strengthen EU-level capacities 
EU-level task force to offer rapid response, 
investigation and/or prosecution 
 
+ central authority and capacity (responsibility & 
visibility)  
- move into higher politics, high coordination 
requirements, questions about ‘reach’ into 
member states 
Rely on ad hoc responses 
Bilateral information exchange/support of cross-
border activities (intelligence/police) 
 
+ appropriate for ‘national events’ (e.g. Breivik) 
- limited capacity for transboundary cooperation; 
irrelevance for transboundary terrorism 
Strengthen EU-national multi-level governance 
(enhanced) Schengen - enhanced information 
exchange and police-judicial cooperation (‘hot 
pursuit’) 
 
+ good cooperation without compromising on 
‘national’ security sovereignty 
- dispersed and less visible authority 
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consistency across networks can be ensured. 
Such problems become even more pertinent 
when turning to other strategies. Ad-hoc 
responses would rely on member states in an 
area of potential high domestic cost, both in 
terms of pre-crisis prevention and during times 
of crises when cooperation among member 
states might be limited. A reliance on 
Europeanisation via standardisation of national 
procedures might therefore offer a degree of 
flexibility to adapt to distinct member state and 
regional arrangements; however, it faces 
questions as to how to ensure consistency 
across regions of the EU (as in the current 
situation).   
 
(3) Backsliding 
Finally, transboundary crises relating to 
member states’ domestic actions that seem to 
violate liberal democratic norms (backsliding) 
reveal the limitations of all potential strategies 
for dealing with transboundary crises. Relying 
on central authority would imply an aggressive 
use of infringement procedures. Such measures 
are likely to aggravate the national political 
backlash against the EU, thereby increasing the 
potential extent of backsliding against  
existing constitutional commitments. Similarly, 
relying on Europeanised provisions that would 
‘punish’ backsliding by the suspension of 
voting rights or financial payments runs the 
risk of enhancing conflict between the EU and 
targeted member state(s) – as in the current 
situation with Poland. In a system such as the 
EU which relies on issue linkages and 
compromises, the explicit ‘naming and  
shaming’ of one or more member state is likely 
to negatively affect wider decision-making, 
leading to gridlock. At the same time, relying 
Table 9: Enhancing transboundary electricity crisis management 
Europeanised member states: strengthen 
consistency among member states 
enhance prescriptive rules applicable to member 
states (to be enacted at national level) 
 
+ accommodates diversity of markets, political 
preferences and industry characteristics 
Strengthen EU-level central capacities 
create EU regulator and central coordinator 
within Commission 
 
+ rise of homogeneity of approaches/information 
on national compliance 
- information asymmetry, inflexible 
Rely on ad hoc responses 
Reliance on bilateral and multi-lateral responses 
to individual crises/near-crises 
 
+ flexible tool and quick response 
- high resilience pre-requisites 
Strengthen EU-national multi-level governance 
Strengthen sectoral governance (ENSO-E) and 
regulatory networks 
 
+ sectoral expertise and legal flexibility 
- sectoral capture, asymmetry of resources among 
members 
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on ‘ad hoc responses’ is unlikely to be 
particularly effective in that it is not linked to  
consequences. Finally, a reliance on multi-level 
governance involves the engagement of third 
actors and venue shifting to redefine the 
conflict away from the existing cleavage 
between member state and the EU. However, 
this strategy runs the risk of being portrayed as 
issue avoidance.  
 
 
 
These illustrations highlight the advantages 
and potential pathologies of particular options 
for enhancing transboundary crisis 
management capacity in the EU. Across 
different types of transboundary crisis, the 
(lack of) actions by member states is 
contributing to costs on the wider EU and its 
member states. The type of costs, however, 
varies, and so do the underlying  
 
 
political and administrative barriers to joint-
working. Both the (lack of) member state action 
and EU response are associated with 
competing visions of what is perceived as 
legitimate. Such diversity calls for an 
appreciation of the need for variety in 
transboundary crisis management capacities in 
the European Union.  
  
Table 10: Enhancing backsliding crisis management 
Europeanised member states: strengthen 
consistency among member states 
Normative pressure - expulsion from party 
groups; financial pressure: threat of budget 
reductions in view of violating key indicators 
 
+ routines, potentially low transaction costs 
- limited effectiveness/backlash by national 
politics/potential issue linkages 
Strengthen EU-level capacities 
Aggressive use of infringement procedures, rule 
of law framework (Art 7) 
 
+ assertion of central norms & maintaining 
integrity of EU 
- backlash by national politics 
Rely on ad hoc responses 
Normative pressure via statements by political 
leaders/reports 
 
+ flexible low cost tool 
- limited effectiveness, symbolic/fig leaf  
function 
Strengthen EU-national multi-level governance 
Strengthen actors outside EU/strengthen third-
party actors at national level 
 
+ alternative venues/redefinition of issues 
- works for narrowly defined issues, mainly issue 
avoidance effect, reinforces ‘them vs us’ rhetoric 
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Appendix 2: List of relevant EU provisions and texts 
Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard 
Security of Electricity Supply and Infrastructure Investment. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/89/oj/eng.  
 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on Conditions for 
Access to the Network for Cross-Border Exchanges in Electricity. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009R0714. 
 
Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on Establishing a Youth Guarantee. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013H0426(01) 
 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central 
Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions. 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj/eng 
 
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/59/oj/eng 
 
Regulation 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 Establishing Uniform Rules 
and a Uniform Procedure for the Resolution of Credit Institutions and Certain Investment Firms in the 
Framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund. 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/806/oj/eng  
 
Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the 
Prevention and Management of the Introduction and Spread of Invasive Alien Species. 2014. 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/1143/oj/eng 
 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version 2016). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:TOC 
 
European Court of Auditors. 2017. ‘Youth Unemployment – Have EU Policies Made a Difference?’ 
Luxemburg: http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=41096.  
  
  
  
 
 
 
